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abstract: This article is based on the premise that social systems are justified via 
the discursive use of modal statements (i.e. sentences in which actors delineate 
that which is possible, impossible, inevitable or contingent) and their associated 
rationales. Within authoritarian states such modal discourse usually reflects a 
relatively coherent ‘modality of permission’. However, when the citizens of such 
states unite to overthrow their totalitarian leaders, their activities are typically 
justified in terms of two mutually inconsistent discursive forms: a ‘modality of 
achievement’ (based on market justice among competitors) vs a ‘modality of 
necessity’ (based on social justice for the masses). These three discursive modali-
ties have theoretical roots in Simmel’s forms of sociation, and can be differentiated 
using content analysis. In an analysis of editorials during Hungary’s first seven 
years of post-Soviet democratization, evidence is found of a steady increase 
during these years in mentions of Hungarians’ opportunities being based on 
economic circumstances as well as in mentions of their responsibilities being 
grounded in political circumstances. This latter finding suggests that as late as 
1997, Hungarian political discourse was heading toward a modality of necessity, 
more like the predominant political modality in Western Europe than the achieve-
ment modality that characterizes political discourse in the US.
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When authoritarian rulers are ousted by their subjects, public demands 
for democratic reform nearly always emerge from an alliance consisting 
not only of large numbers of workers and/or peasants, but also of entre-
preneurially minded (or bourgeois) members of their own governments. 
Yet once democratic institutions are developed, newly elected politicians 
find themselves faced with a mixed mandate because policies ensuring 
social justice for the masses are typically inconsistent with ones ensuring 
‘market justice’ on behalf of the bourgeoisie. The theoretical premise of 
this article is that each of these types of policy is best justified in accor-
dance with a distinct discursive form – a free-market political discourse 
(commonly, but not exclusively, used in the US) vs a social-justice political 
discourse (commonly, but not exclusively, used in the welfare states of 
Western Europe and Scandinavia).1  Linking each form to a distinct 
modality, we show how each of these discursive forms has an internal 
dynamic not unlike a Simmelian ‘form of sociation’. Illustrations of the 
two forms are provided in an analysis of domestic political discourse 
during Hungary’s first years as a democratic nation.
Democratization and its Justification
A dynamic repeatedly mentioned in studies of democratic transforma-
tions is the simultaneous decline in support for a country’s authoritarian 
rulers by both a locally emerging entrepreneurial class and a disenfran-
chised class of workers and/or peasants (Markoff, 1990; Poulantzas, 
1976). Sometimes bourgeois elites discover broad-based economic dissat-
isfaction coinciding with their long-standing efforts toward economic 
restructuring (Cardoso, 1986; O’Neil, 1996), whereas at other times it is 
during mass unrest that elites first see reform as an opportunity (Arrighi, 
1985; Verdery, 1993) or an inevitability (Seidman, 1994). Either way, the 
combined power of these two segments of industrializing societies have 
been instrumental in many a democratic transformation.2
Formal alliances between entrepreneurs and masses tend to be rare, how-
ever. According to Marxist orthodoxy a deep divide exists between the class 
interests of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and the proletarian workers 
whom they exploit. And indeed, studies of democratization have repeat-
edly found bourgeois and worker interests to diverge, despite their com-
mon dissatisfaction with autocratic rule (see Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 
271ff.). For example, in his analysis of grievances written by citizens of 
French rural parishes just prior to the French Revolution, Markoff (1990: 
416) notes that ‘the French countryside was animated by considerations of 
services received, of equity and even of something verging on a sense of 
potential citizenship’. Yet generalizing from grievances of bourgeois origin, 
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‘the Third Estate is noteworthy for its (critical) emphasis on privilege and 
on barriers to the development of the market’ (Markoff, 1990: 422). Similarly, 
in late 1988, a Hungarian ‘reform circle’ of party cadres called on their fel-
low citizens ‘to liquidate the structure of the Stalinist model’ and to require 
a ‘clear strategy for reintegration into the world economy (above all a func-
tioning market and the revival of rejected bourgeois values)’ (O’Neil, 1996: 
292).3 In contrast, in nationwide polls two years later, ‘Hungarians appear 
to be reluctant to abandon those state-provided social benefits to which 
they had grown accustomed under the socialist regime’ (Szelényi et al., 
1996: 472). Although the concerns of the masses are with social justice and 
those of the bourgeoisie are with an unencumbered marketplace, their con-
crete interests in deposing a common leadership coincide when this leader-
ship neither meets the basic needs of the masses nor allows fair competition 
among the bourgeoisie. Democracy becomes their common alternative, 
because it promises that leaders will be held accountable for deviations 
they make from social and market justice.
Once authoritarian rule ends, the alliance between masses and bour-
geoisie is typically replaced by party divisions in accordance with their 
respective policy concerns. For example, since its first democratic election 
in 1990, Hungary’s major political parties have developed social agendas 
falling into either a social-justice camp (consisting of the MSZP, the social-
democratic successor to the former Communist Party, and the liberal 
SZDSZ, which has declined steadily in the polls since 1990) or a market-
justice camp (consisting initially of the MDF and more recently of the 
FIDESZ).4  Legislative decisions call for choices between the policies advo-
cated by representatives from each of these camps, because implementa-
tion of one of the former allies’ interests will commonly prove counter to 
the other ally’s interests:5
· By redistributing wealth to meet constituents’ needs, the government 
inevitably does so by limiting reinvestment in the marketplace.
· By allowing broad discretion over constituents’ profits, the government 
will have few resources with which to assist its neediest constituents.
And so, we have our traditional left–right political divide.6  On the left 
are those who justify government activities in terms of how well they 
manage a social system within which constituents’ hardships are mini-
mized; on the right are those who justify such activities in terms of how 
well they ensure a stable economic field within which constituents can 
accumulate wealth. Beyond a consensus on the general benefits of a 
healthy national economy, at issue is whether the state’s role is to mini-
mize its citizens’ risks or to maximize their opportunities.
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Roberts et. al.,  Modalities of Democratic Transformation
501
Modalities as Discursive Forms
The promise of democratic institutions is that elected officials’ power 
remains contingent on their responsiveness to public opinion – attitudes 
and beliefs formed, in part, via public discourse in mass media. Although 
the media–public opinion link is not investigated here, important insights 
into its dynamics are gained through improved understanding of how 
social issues are characterized in mediated public discourse. Communications 
literature provides overwhelming evidence that mediated public dis-
course influences public opinion. For example, research on agenda setting 
(Dearing and Rogers, 1996; McCombs and Shaw, 1972) provides evidence 
that issues raised in the media become issues that voters deem important. 
Research on priming (Druckman, 2004; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987) yields 
evidence that voters’ evaluation criteria tend to be ones that appear fre-
quently in the news. Moreover, if a political party has been consistently 
depicted in the media as having ‘ownership’ of a particular stance on an 
issue, the party will gain public support when this stance is emphasized 
in the news (Abbe et al., 2003; Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996). Yet 
public discourse involves more than mere mentions of issues and evalua-
tion criteria; it encompasses debates regarding the very possibility or 
impossibility of social policies, as well as arguments for or against their 
necessity (Roberts, 2008).
Our theoretical position is that social justice and market justice are jus-
tifications for social policy, each of which is grounded in a distinct modal-
ity (i.e. a discursive form in which speakers socially construct each other’s 
activities by referring to their possibility, impossibility, inevitability or 
contingency). Like Simmel’s ‘forms of sociation’ (Vergesellschaftungsformen), 
each discursive form is characterized by a tension among interactants as 
they simultaneously seek to preserve the form while acting in their form-
specific interests. Before distinguishing two modalities associated with 
the right vs left policy justifications described in the previous section, we 
begin by describing the modality associated with the type of authoritarian 
society from which most democracies emerge – a modality for which 
Simmel ([1909] 1984) has already laid theoretical foundations, albeit 
within the more restricted social context of flirtation.
With apologies for his presumption – understandable given the over 
100-year-old social context within which it was written – that in flirtation 
‘the object of love is a woman and its subject a man’ (Simmel, [1909] 1984: 
133), Simmel depicts this social form as one that lasts only until the 
woman reveals her self (i.e. when she publicly acknowledges her commit-
ment to a particular man). To avoid a common misinterpretation, it is 
important to recognize that for Simmel ‘what the woman does for the 
man’ is not what is at stake in flirtation. At issue is what she reveals to him. 
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
International Sociology Vol. 24 No. 4
502
Her conquest only takes place once she definitively discloses her genuine 
support for her suitor’s marital intentions. Yet during flirtation – and 
thus, for Simmel, prior to such a disclosure of loyalty – her behavior oscil-
lates along a scale ‘between affirmation and the denial of genuineness’:
However, each stage on this scale can be put to the use of flirtation, by men as 
well as women. This is because the subject stands behind his expression in a 
semi-veiled fashion and gives us the feeling that he seems to offer himself and to 
slip through our hands at almost the same moment. (Simmel [1909] 1984: 138)
Thus flirtation involves a target, who guardedly values the flirt’s loyalty, and 
a flirt, who refrains from divulging to whom her loyalties genuinely belong.
The gap between flirtatious discourse and the dominant discourse 
within authoritarian states narrows when one recalls that Stalin’s rise to 
power was built by gradually developing an environment within which 
it was dangerous to prematurely disclose one’s loyalties.
The way the system operated under Stalin’s long rule tended to eliminate those 
who were threats as potential rivals to one-man dictatorship and to favor, on 
the whole, those who were shrewd, cautious plotters who took few unneces-
sary risks but had good organizational ability (Bauer et al., 1960: 199)
This discursive form remained predominant in the Soviet republics and 
satellites prior to 1989, and is still much in evidence in contemporary 
Russia. Like coy suitors, Soviet officials would vie to retain their places of 
authority within the dominant discourse by withholding support for any 
activity for which they might be held responsible. For example, after a 
meeting with Russian intellectuals during which he had repeatedly 
responded to their suggestions with discouragement, George Soros (1990: 
23) reports, ‘they told me they loved it. “A Soviet official will never say 
no. You said no ten times in ten minutes: it was so refreshing.” ’ Or, con-
sider his description of his dealings in 1987 with Georg Miasnikov, then 
deputy chairman of the Cultural Foundation of the USSR: ‘Unfailingly 
polite, he used every opportunity to create obstacles, yet he always 
yielded in the end because he did not want to take the responsibility for 
our failure’ (Soros, 1990: 20). Decades earlier Bauer et al. (1960: 189) char-
acterized such demeanor as the result of a social system in which ‘nobody 
is fully trustworthy, nevertheless numerous individuals must be held 
responsible for what is demanded by the Center’.
By placing excessive demands on its citizens, the regime creates a situation in 
which small groups become bound together by ties of mutual interest of the 
‘you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours’ variety. These small, mutually 
protective societies grow up on the local level among people bound together 
by self-interest and ties of responsibility that set them off against ‘the Center.’ 
(Bauer et al., 1960: 177)
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Roberts et. al.,  Modalities of Democratic Transformation
503
The dynamics of flirtation enter in as people build networks of loyal rela-
tionships beyond which promises are withdrawn at will.
Each of Simmel’s sociational forms was characterized by a self-sustaining 
dynamic, which in the case of flirtation involves suitors’ ongoing attempts 
to remain ‘in play’ (whether it be as marriage-worthy partner or as loyalty-
worthy comrade). Yet these dynamics have a modal character never 
made explicit in Simmel’s writings. That is, Simmel’s social forms can be 
understood as discursively maintained by an actor’s and an observer’s 
use of modal statements (i.e. grammatical clauses, each with a single, 
inflected, modal auxiliary verb). When consistently used, modal state-
ments afford guidelines for human behaviors, inhibiting activities with 
realizations depicted as impossible or inevitable, and promoting those 
with realizations depicted as possible or contingent. This fourfold divi-
sion among social actions is a byproduct of the fact that every modal 
statement can be negated in three ways – by negation of the modal, the 
main verb, or both.7
For example, flirtatious statements will convey one of the following (only 
the first of which would be stated by the flirt in earnest) modal forms:8
· Contingency (main verb negated): I am permitted not to disclose my loy-
alty. (I may always deny what you say about me.)
· Possibility (no negation): You are [at this moment] permitted to disclose 
my loyalty. (Although desirous of making such a disclosure, the target 
fears that the flirt would deny that the loyalty is genuine.)
· Impossibility (modal negated): You are [still] not permitted to disclose my 
loyalty. (Desirous of making such a disclosure, the target nonetheless 
hopes that the flirt might reconsider permitting it.)9
Flirtation terminates when the flirt acknowledges:
· Inevitability (negations of both modal and main verb): I am not permitted 
not to disclose my loyalty. (For example, the flirt may publicly promise 
loyalty to the target, as in marriage.)
Notice how the first statement sets out the discursive context as one in 
which disclosure is entirely contingent on the flirt. That is, disclosure 
remains non-inevitable until it becomes inevitable through an irreversible 
pronouncement (e.g. of marital or, possibly, political loyalty) as in the last 
statement. Despite her words the flirt keeps her loyalty ambiguous, leav-
ing the target believing that disclosure of this loyalty remains possible. To 
keep their options open, flirts will only rarely pronounce their loyalty to 
be absolutely impossible. Instead, given that any disclosure by the target is 
contingent on the flirt’s acquiescence, she will likely confine her utter-
ances to ambiguous variants of the second and third statements above as 
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a means of prolonging the tension, and thereby the form, of flirtatious 
interaction.
Thus, like most of Simmel’s social forms, flirtation, or permission, is 
perhaps best understood as a contingent social context. Here all discourse 
is contingent on the flirt’s unknown intentions. Yet with the contrasting 
modality of ability, or achievement, all discourse is contingent on an 
agent’s ongoing intention toward attaining a goal – an intention known to 
interested observers, or stakeholders.
Achievement begins when the agent declares her or his intentions to 
observers, who, (s)he hopes, will show an interest (possibly a financial one) 
in the agent’s success. Contracts are concrete manifestations of such inter-
est, consisting of agreement on both precisely what constitutes the goal to 
be attained (specifying the conditions to be met prior to proclaiming goal-
attainment) and a deadline (after which stakeholders are to disclose 
whether it is inevitable or impossible for them to proclaim these conditions as 
having being met). Potential statements of ability are as follows:
· Contingency: You are able not to proclaim goal-attainment. (Stakeholders 
will refrain from calling attention to the widely understood fact that 
the agent’s goal-attainment is optional.)
· Possibility: You are [still] able to proclaim having attained the goal. 
(Desirous of goal-attainment, stakeholders direct the agent toward 
internal or external resources that may yield success.)
· Impossibility: I am not [at this moment] able to proclaim goal-attain-
ment. (Although hoping to be able to proclaim goal-attainment, 
stakeholders provide focus by reminding the agent of the conditions 
for goal-attainment.)
Achievement terminates when a stakeholder acknowledges,
· Inevitability: I am not able not to proclaim goal-attainment. (For example, 
stakeholders may no longer withhold payment for the agent’s con-
tracted work.)1 0
Although the social form of achievement is based on a social context in 
which agency is contingent on agents’ willing participation, mention of this 
contingency is taboo. Stakeholders hold such discourse at bay by provid-
ing agents with a balance of reminders that goal-attainment is possible for 
them, yet impossible if the conditions of goal-attainment are unmet at dead-
line. As stakeholders they prefer that the goal is attained – an occasion 
when their proclamation to that effect becomes inevitable. Whereas during 
flirtation the woman maintains a tension in the mind of her target regard-
ing her subjective intentions, during achievement stakeholders maintain a 
tension in the mind of an agent regarding an ‘objective’ goal – one that will 
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‘prove’ either within or beyond the agent’s reach. The more abstract the 
goal (e.g. original scholarship), the more discretion stakeholders have in 
their maintenance of this tension.
In his writings on what has come to be called ‘The Web of Group-
Affiliations’ (Simmel, [1922] 1955), Simmel noted that competition 
between agents is characteristically offset by their cooperative efforts to 
ensure that they, as stakeholders, mutually recognize each other’s achieve-
ments. For example, a merchant ‘pursues his interests by means of the 
most bitter competition with those with whom he must often unite closely 
for the sake of common interests’ (Simmel, [1922] 1955: 155). Thus, as 
stakeholders, merchants may choose prescriptive or proscriptive social-
ization strategies conducive to a healthy marketplace – ones likely to 
optimize proclamations of goal-attainment. Accordingly, Simmel ([1922] 
1955: 156) continued, group affiliations provide ‘opportunities for social-
ization’ as well as ones for competition. Moreover, if we extend Simmel’s 
position by presuming the contingency of all goal-related behaviors on 
agents’ willing participation, group membership too is added to the 
potential objects of agents’ rational choices (see Hechter, 1990).
Whereas during flirtation the woman actively refrains from establishing 
group membership with the target and whereas during achievement the 
agent readily abandons the group to expedite goal-attainment, collabora-
tors (i.e. participants who choose group membership over expediency) opt 
for a modality of necessity over one of either ability or permission. More 
specifically, when necessity is the modality, sociable discourse is contin-
gent on it being unnecessary for any collaborator to remind others of their 
responsibilities (i.e. of the group-maintenance activities they are duty-
bound to fulfill). Most parents are intimately familiar with this modality, 
as becomes evident in such everyday references to the meal that one ‘must’ 
prepare, the kids one ‘has to’ pick up, etc. Necessity confers a sense of duty 
and responsibility on one’s activities. Here one’s actions are not strategies 
toward proclamations of goals attained, but are tactics for preventing oth-
ers from recognizing responsibilities one may have neglected (e.g. the 
well-being of one’s family). Statements of this modality are as follows:11
· Contingency: I am not required to recognize your responsibilities. 
(Observers will refrain from mentioning others’ responsibilities when 
they do not appear to be neglected.)
· Possibility: You are [still] not required not to recognize your responsibili-
ties. (Desirous of group maintenance, observers may convey disap-
proval to collaborators who do not [i.e. who presumably believe they 
need not] act conscientiously.)
· Impossibility: You are [at this moment] required not to recognize your 
responsibilities. (A conscientious collaborator’s efforts may nonetheless 
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be so poor [e.g. due to illness] that group maintenance would be better 
served were such responsibilities left to others.)
Sociability ends (and responsibility is reinitiated) when the observer 
notes:
· Inevitability: I am required to recognize your responsibilities. (For exam-
ple, after noticing a neighbor’s obese children an observer might 
exclaim, ‘You must feed your kids healthier foods.’)
Note that when the modality is one of permission, loyalty between flirt 
and target is contingent; when it is one of necessity, what is contingent is 
each collaborator’s responsibility to ensure that others recognize their 
own responsibilities for their common well-being.1 2  In the sociational 
form (Vergesellschaftungsform) he referred to as sociability (Geselligkeit), 
Simmel described this latter modality as one in which ‘the pleasure of the 
individual is always contingent upon the joy of others’ as well as the only 
one ‘in which a democracy of equals is possible without friction’ (Simmel, 
[1911] 1949: 257). While being sociable, responsible collaborators of soci-
ety join in carefree conversation that is played out between ‘an upper and 
a lower sociability threshold for the individual’ (Simmel, [1911] 1949: 256). 
Sociability is maintained through subtle allusions to either the possibility 
that someone’s subjective intentions might be more responsible or the 
impossibility that someone’s objective accomplishments will benefit oth-
ers. For example, comments about a colleague’s seemingly unconscien-
tious demeanor will likely involve irony (e.g. ‘Nice of you to come to the 
office today, stranger’), thereby providing potential slackers ‘space’ in 
which to defend their integrity (e.g. ‘I had to go to a meeting for company 
business’). The sociability threshold is passed when, despite such playful 
mutual policing, one collaborator finds it necessary, or inevitable, to 
remind another collaborator of her or his responsibilities.
And so one is left to speculate about the type of modality most likely to 
become predominant in a country, like Hungary, that has shed its totalitar-
ian past and has set up democratic institutions. Under such circumstances, 
citizens learn quickly that it is no longer dangerous to disclose their ideas, 
and thus no longer necessary to probe others’ loyalties in accordance with 
a modality of permission. In the Hungarian case, this learning process was 
relatively gradual, since considerable economic reforms had begun as 
early as the 1960s (particularly in agriculture) whereby small-scale entre-
preneurs were given some freedom to innovate (Róna-Tas, 1997; Seleny, 
1999). Nonetheless, political changes in 1989 did leave unclear whether 
within Hungary’s newly democratic society disclosure of such innovations 
would retain some loyalty aspects, no longer within antagonistic factions 
vying for power, but among fellow countrymen and women whom one 
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may occasionally need to remind of their responsibilities to the welfare of 
all. Or would disclosures be of goals attained, that is, of individual abilities 
made manifest? More specifically put, would goals be abandoned when 
socially irresponsible, or would the general welfare be jettisoned when no 
longer expedient? Finally, recast in Simmel’s terminology, would socializa-
tion or competition prevail? To answer these questions we suggest that one 
must examine the rationales that the country’s people use to discursively 
justify their modal statements.
Modal Statements and their Rationales
Not all modal statements are equally likely to gain expression. For example, 
contingency is unlikely to be used in public discourse (i.e. in discourse 
among participants, who are well versed in the modality at hand). This is 
because such statements comprise ‘keyings’ for tuning participants into 
‘what it is we think is really going on’ (Goffman, 1974: 45). With a contin-
gency statement, the source (i.e. the speaker or author) reminds her or his 
audience of the ‘discursive rules’ currently in play. Thus, if faced with an 
overly aggressive target, the flirt may choose to state the self-evident: ‘Don’t 
forget. I am permitted not to marry you, if I so choose.’ The agent’s willing-
ness and the collaborator’s restraint are also usually self-evident to those 
socialized in the discourse at hand. Only to an overly demanding stake-
holder will the agent feel moved to say, ‘Keep in mind that I can quit (i.e. I 
am able not to finish this job) at any time.’ And only to someone puzzled at 
a lack of close supervision would a fellow collaborator be likely to com-
ment, ‘Since you are doing your job, I do not need to remind you to act 
responsibly.’ Contingency statements are thus for the benefit of participants 
who appear insufficiently schooled in the appropriate rules of discourse. 
One would expect such socializing statements to be rare among (presum-
ably socialized) citizens engaged in public national discourse.
However, when the discursive modality is one of achievement, modal state-
ments will likely convey possibility. This is because possibility is typically 
conveyed at three moments within this discourse. First, a modality of 
achievement is initiated when agents publicly state that their goal- 
attainment is possible (‘I can create jobs’). Second, during achievement 
stakeholders will reinforce the agent’s belief in this possibility by pro-
viding verbal and material support (‘You can get that American dream’). 
Third, when stakeholders affirm goal-attainment, this is likely to be 
done with an acknowledgment of the agent’s abilities (i.e. the possibility 
of future goal-attainment of the same kind) (‘He is able to provide party 
leadership’). In contrast, stakeholders will likely restrict their statements 
of impossibility for fear of discouraging the agent, and they will only 
mention inevitability once (i.e. at the moment of goal-attainment).
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In contrast, when the discursive modality is one of necessity, modal state-
ments will likely convey inevitability. There are three key occasions for 
these statements as well. First, such discourse is initiated when sociabil-
ity breaks down and an observer reminds a collaborator of that person’s 
responsibility (i.e. of something the collaborator must, inevitability, do) 
(‘You must alleviate unemployment’). Second, when such a reminder is 
to a highly responsible person, the observer will likely apologize by 
explaining that the reminder was given of necessity (i.e. as an inevitable, 
responsible act from a fellow collaborator) (‘Please forgive me for having 
to ask you this, but . . .’). Third, when others’ unflattering implications 
become too blatant, collaborators will justify their ‘seeming impropri-
eties’ as having been required (‘We had to impose austere measures to 
keep the economy from stagnating’). In contrast, sociable talk may suf-
fer if numerous modal statements are made regarding colleagues’ pos-
sible lack of conscientiousness or their impossible potential for helping 
others. And – like goal-attainment within the modality of achievement – 
‘in sociability talking is an end in itself’ (Simmel, [1911] 1949: 259).
All such modal statements require a rationale for their completion. That 
is to say, it is always reasonable to ask the source of a modal statement for 
a rationale regarding the possibility, impossibility, inevitability or contin-
gency of the statement’s predicate (e.g. of disclosure of the flirt’s loyalty, of 
proclamation of the agent’s goal-attainment or of recognition of a collabora-
tor’s responsibilities). Thus, for example, within a modality of permission, 
possibility and impossibility are accounted for in terms of someone’s (e.g. a 
comrade’s) discretion, and the contingency of such discretions is justified as 
entirely a matter of discretionary license (see Simmel, [1909] 1984: 140).
So what rationale might be appropriate for calling someone to duty, or 
for asserting the possibility of someone’s goal-attainment? Given that 
within a modality of necessity modal statements tend to convey a collabo-
rator’s requirements, rationales for these requirements will likely reference 
responsibilities unmet by the collaborator. In contrast, given that within a 
modality of achievement modal statements tend to convey an agent’s pos-
sibility of success, rationales for such success will likely reference promis-
ing opportunities available to the agent. For example, the following text 
states that Hungarian government representatives’ responsibility to over-
whelmingly elect judges is because judge appointments are not to be the 
product of political interests:
Another, although it is not written in regulations anywhere, requirement that 
belongs to the democratic state-of-law is that one-sided political interests should 
not be enforced when Constitutional judges are selected. That is why the law says 
that Constitutional judges must be elected by the votes of two-thirds of the 
Parliamentary Representatives. (Népszabadság, 18 November 1996: 11; emphasis 
added here and below)
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On the other hand, political power can afford opportunities such as the 
ability for a politician to express his views:
István Csurka . . . was elected as a member of the fraction leadership in the fraction 
meeting on Sunday. From now on, from this position he can explain his highly 
coherent views about internal enemies who are supported from abroad, about 
the tasks of the Hungarian-Christian middle-class, and about defenseless 
Hungarian minorities. (Népszabadság, 19 March 1991: 3) 
Moreover, in economic discourse (i.e. discourse in which economic 
rationales are given for modal statements) fiscal regulations may be used 
as rationales for legislators’ responsibilities:
This time the government had to reduce the budget deficit drastically in accor-
dance with the agreement with the International Monetary Fund. (Népszabadság, 10 
August 1990: 7)
And economic strategies may be given as rationales for Hungarian 
opportunities:
. . . in several countries like the US, Japan, or even in Croatia, the utilization of solar 
energy seems to accelerate, they spend more and more on research and development. . . . 
This looks like a train that we can still catch. (Népszabadság, 2 August 1996: 3)
As these illustrations show, there may be political, economic and other 
reasons why something is depicted as possible, inevitable, etc. within a 
nation’s public discourse. Moreover, there is ample empirical basis for 
developing hypotheses. Despite the free-market, IMF-promoted fiscal 
challenges of (and occasional revocations of welfare programs during) the 
1990s and their concomitant marketplace experiences, several opinion 
polls show that ‘the majority of Central and Eastern European citizens are 
indeed very much in favor of the fully-fledged “European Model” ’ 
(Ferge, 2001: 151; see also Ferge et al., 1996; Tomka, 2006). Accordingly, we 
venture two hypotheses regarding political discourse within Hungary’s 
largest daily newspaper between 1990 and 1997:
H1:  The modality of Hungary’s political discourse transformed during 
these years from one of achievement to one of necessity.
H2:  The modality of Hungary’s economic discourse transformed in pre-
cisely the opposite direction during this time.
Data
Four quotations in the previous section are excerpts from a sample of 
editorials that appeared in the Hungarian newspaper Népszabadság 
between August 1990 (the month when Árpád Göncz became Hungary’s 
first post-Communism elected president) and June 1997. Starting in 1956 
Népszabadság (People’s Freedom) was the official national newspaper of 
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the Hungarian Communist Party (MSZMP), with a pre-1989 circulation of 
about 695,000 copies daily (about a third of Hungary’s adult population) 
(Gulyás, 2000). In 1990, the MSZP (as successor to the MSZMP) handed 
over the newspaper’s ownership to a social-democratic-leaning founda-
tion (The Free Press Foundation), which sold controlling interest (namely, 
68 percent) to Gruner & Jahr – a subsidiary of the German media giant, 
Bertelsmann, AG. As part of the collective bargaining agreement with 
Bertelsmann, writers were allowed virtually unrestricted journalistic free-
doms, including the prerogative to elect their own editor-in-chief (Jakab 
et al., 1991). Népszabadság remains Hungary’s largest daily newspaper 
with a current circulation of about 220,000.
Népszabadság is the least biased, yet consistent public forum for political 
and social discourse available on Hungary during the period of this study. 
Although left-leaning and intellectual, the newspaper is generally consid-
ered to provide balanced coverage of national politics. For example, 
Lange (1994) reports that in Népszabadság during the 1994 election the 
conservative MDF had 27 percent of the unpaid coverage (30 percent of 
the newspaper’s free informational coverage and 25 percent of its edito-
rial content), MSZP had 24 percent (16 percent informational and 33 per-
cent editorial) and SZDSZ had 16 percent (20 percent informational and 
15 percent editorial). Compared to the broadcast media, Népszabadság had 
a relatively easier time maintaining control of its content during the 
‘media war’ of 1993–4 when leaders within the Antall–Boross govern-
ment struggled to monopolize political coverage (Hankiss, 1994; Popescu 
and Tóka, 2000; Tamas, 1999). Moreover, given the Hungarian people’s 
awareness of these struggles and their strong support for press freedom 
(Bajomi-Lázár, 2003: 185–9), plus their general affinity for social-democratic 
(i.e. social-justice) values (Szelényi et al., 1996), the newspaper managed 
to sustain a reasonably credible image despite national surveys of journal-
ists indicating a decrease in their autonomy (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003: 117–18) 
and online reports by the Freedom House that press freedom in Hungary 
was hovering between ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ between 1990 and 1997. 
Thus in comparison to other archival sources, editorials published in 
Népszabadság likely comprise the most consistent population of Hungarian 
political and social discourse during the period of study.
Note that our generalizations are entirely restricted to this text population. 
Inferences regarding the study period are being made neither to the content 
of Hungarian newspapers (or other news media) in general nor even to the 
total content of the newspaper Népszabadság. Instead, our generalizations are 
exclusively to a segment of Hungarian discourse that is both as consistent 
and as representative as possible of all voices regarding the social issues of 
the time. We test whether this discourse shifted toward a modality of 
achievement vs one of necessity during the years immediately after 1989.
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Editorials were sampled using a systematic area sampling design, 
whereby one weekday was randomly sampled from within every second 
week during the study period. A point-location was then randomly sam-
pled from within Népszabadság’s first section – the section containing most 
news of national importance – and the article containing this location was 
examined to determine if it was an editorial. If not, another point-location 
was sampled from within the same newspaper issue, until an editorial 
was found and then included in the sample. During this process an 
article was classified as ‘an editorial’ if its author was a Hungarian citizen 
and if the article’s last three paragraphs contained at least one statement 
containing an inflected modal auxiliary verb (can, must, ought, etc.) with 
two characteristics. First, the verb’s subject had to be a Hungarian citizen. 
(Thus a statement like ‘conflicts can turn into hostilities’ does not qualify 
because its subject is not a person.) This was to ensure that our study is one 
of modalities that apply to Hungarians. Second, a rationale for the state-
ment must have been made explicit in the article’s last three paragraphs. 
This procedure yielded a total of 171 editorials with approximately 26 edi-
torials per year.13 From descriptors added to many bylines, this sample can 
be seen to represent discourse from relatively elite sources, including jour-
nalists, university professors, authors, politicians, entrepreneurs, represen-
tatives of civic and religious organizations and other concerned citizens.
The first and last three paragraphs of each editorial were transposed into 
extremely literal English translations, preserving the same clause structure 
throughout to retain the text’s original character as well as its subject–verb 
relations. Entire editorials were not translated to ensure that the volume of 
text representing each time point would remain relatively constant. To iden-
tify modal statements indicating possibility and inevitability, we searched 
the translations for all varieties of the modal auxiliary verbs ‘can’ (including 
variants of ‘being able to’ and ‘having the ability to’) and ‘must’ (including 
variants of ‘having to’ and ‘needing to’). Eighteen editorials contained no 
instances of these two types of modal auxiliary verbs (or, if they did, they did 
not meet either the Hungarian-subject or rationale criteria mentioned earlier) 
and were eliminated from the sample, producing our final sample size of 470 
modality-statements-plus-rationales nested within 153 editorials.
Each modality statement was classified according to its modal form 
(i.e. as indicating possibility, impossibility, inevitability or contingency), 
depending on whether (and how) it was negated. Thus, non-negated 
instances of the aforementioned varieties of ‘can’ were classified as indi-
cating possibility, whereas those of ‘must’ were classified under inevita-
bility. Impossibility was the classification of statements containing 
expressions like ‘cannot’, ‘unable to’, ‘have no ability to’, ‘mustn’t’, ‘have 
to not’ and ‘need not to’. Contingency was the classification of modality 
statements containing ‘can not’, ‘able not to’, ‘have the ability not to’, ‘not 
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something one must do’, ‘don’t have to’ and ‘don’t need to’. Double 
negatives (e.g. ‘not able not to’ and ‘don’t need not to’) are exceptionally 
rare in natural language expressions, and did not surface in our data.1 4
Rationales associated with each modal statement were categorized as 
based on Hungarian politics, culture, economy or security. The idea here 
is that each modal-statement-plus-rationale can be ‘read’ according to the 
following template:15
Political reasons differ from economic ones in that the former account 
for the possibility, impossibility, etc. of Hungarians’ actions as the conse-
quence of activities by politicians and political bodies, whereas the latter 
account for them as due to aspects of the market and segments of the 
economy (e.g. agriculture or industry). Cultural rationales account for the 
contingency, inevitability, etc. of Hungarians’ actions as due to Hungary’s 
heritage, its language, its morality and its plight (e.g. regarding its poor 
and handicapped). When the potential for Hungarians’ actions was attrib-
uted to such things as safety, order and the military, the modal statement’s 
rationale was classified as security.16
Table 1 provides a cross-classification of the 470 modal statements 
according to the statements’ modal forms and their rationales’ bases in 
politics, culture, economics or security. As expected, only a few (fewer 
than 2 percent) modal statements conveyed contingency – a form that, for 
reasons explained earlier, observers of both agents and collaborators tend 
to avoid. Of the other modal forms, over half were of possibility, over a 
quarter were of impossibility and under one-fifth were of inevitability. It 
is not surprising that over a third of the rationales provided in a national 
newspaper’s first section would be of a political nature. Cultural and 
economic rationales were about equally prevalent, with each accounting 
for just under 28 percent of the modal statements. Security was least likely 
(under 10 percent) to be used as a reason for a Hungarian’s possibilities, 
impossibilities, inevitabilities or contingencies. Distributions within the body 
of the table vary little from these reasonable, yet theoretically unremark-
able marginal patterns. As previously argued, our theoretical interest is in 
post-1989 trends in Hungarians’ discursive linking of specific rationales 
with specific modal forms. More concretely put, we are interested in 
three-way interactions between time, rationale and modal form.
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Method and Results
Our unit of analysis is the modal-statement-plus-rationale, more than one 
of which may be nested within a single editorial. Given this nesting and 
the tendency for journalists to focus on a consistent message within their 
editorials, it is likely that modal statements within the same editorial are 
more likely to have identical modal forms and rationales than modal 
statements in different editorials. In a form-by-rationale table of such 
statements these clusters of identical modal statements will yield larger 
variations in cell frequencies than corresponding variations in the popula-
tion of all such modal statements. Multilevel models were developed to 
deal with this problem, thereby allowing researchers to test hypotheses on 
how contextual variables (e.g. time) at one level are associated with rela-
tions (e.g. between modal forms and rationales) at another level (Davidian 
and Giltinan, 1995; Vonesh and Chinchilli, 1997). The multilevel model 
(Pinheiro and Bates, 1995) used in this analysis is: 
 log(mij
 + D) = l + lMi + lRj + llL + qlQ + lijMR + lliML +  
 qliMQ + lljRL + qljRQ + llijMRL + qlijMRQ 
where mij is the expected count of i
th modal form and jth rationale category, 
l is linear time in 1-year increments from –3.5 for 1990 until 3.5 for 1997, 
q is quadratic time (centered with largest values at the extremes), and the l 
are modal form and rationale effects such that Σ
i
lMi = Σj l
R
j = Σi  Σj lij





lijMRQ = 0. As suggested by Agresti (1990: 250) for sparse tables such as 
ours, sampling zeros are retained in our data by adding D = 10–8 to each 
cell in our contingency table.
Given our 153 clusters plus the four-levels each of our modal form 
and rationale variables, the table described by this model has 2448 (4 × 
4 × 153) cells – too many to yield sufficient power for drawing statistical 
Table 1 Percentages of Modality Statements According to Rationale and Modal Form
 Rationale
Modal form Politics Culture Economy Security Total
Possible 19.1 (90) 15.1 (71) 15.1 (71) 4.5 (21) 53.8 (253)
Impossible 8.9 (42) 8.6 (40) 5.5 (26) 3.0 (14) 26.0 (122)
Inevitable 6.2 (29) 3.7 (17) 6.6 (31) 1.9 (9) 18.3 (86)
Contingent 0.6 (3) 0.6 (3) 0.4 (2) 0.2 (1) 1.9 (9)
Total 34.9 (164) 27.9 (131) 27.6 (130) 9.6 (45) 
Note: Frequencies are in parentheses below percentages. N = 470.
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inferences about any but the most enormous of the effects it is intended 
to estimate. For this reason, we collapse the table in 16 ways allowing 
each combination of rationale and modal form to be analyzed separately. 
Thus we are fitting the above multilevel loglinear model to sixteen 612 
(2 × 2 × 153) cell contingency tables, such that in each model when i = 1 a 
specific modal form is indexed and when i = 2 all other modal forms are 
indexed. Likewise, in these models when j = 1 a specific rationale is 
indexed and when j = 2 all other rationale types are indexed.
When estimating these models we assume that their errors are distrib-
uted normally about zero and that the observed cell frequencies have a 
Poisson distribution, such that Yij ~ Poisson (mij). Moreover, designating all 
observed counts as Y and all expected counts as M, the model can be 
rewritten as
 log(E(Y + D)) = log (M + D) = Xα + ZEβE 
where α is the vector of the model’s 12 unknown λs and X is the design 
matrix of known constants for the model’s fixed effects. Editorials, within 
which modal statements are clustered, are identified within the matrix, 
ZE, allowing the marginal effects of each editorial to be estimated as one 
of the 153 elements, or βk, within the vector, βE. In making these estimates 
we make the standard assumptions that the expected value of each edito-
rial’s effect is zero (i.e. E(βE) = 0), that the editorial effects are independent 
of each other and have the same variance (i.e. that Var(βk) = s2βE, k = 
1...153), and that there are no joint effects between editorials and any com-
bination of modal form, rationale or time. Table 2 lists parameter esti-
mates for the seven interactions specified in our model. (The five marginal 
effects in each model have been omitted from the table given their lack of 
theoretical importance.) All are true maximum likelihood estimates 
obtained using NLMIXED in SAS.
The campaign leading up to Hungary’s June 1994 elections took place 
at nearly the middle of the time period during which our sampled editori-
als were published. Our model’s estimates of interactions between qua-
dratic time and modal forms and/or rationales, were introduced to 
capture discourse specific to this election. Although there is no evidence 
in Table 2 of any change in modal form associated with the 1994 election 
campaign, there is (in the rationale with quadratic time column) clear 
evidence that generally for all modal statements (i.e. irrespective of modal 
form) there was a shift at election time away from economic rationales 
and toward rationales based on politics and security. Note how closely 
this jibes with the following list of 1994 campaign issues given by Popescu 
and Tóka (2000: 5): ‘the democratic credentials and relative competence of 
the different parties, various themes related to the religious vs. secular, 
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anti-communist vs. excommunist, nationalist vs. cosmopolitan divide, or 
the ongoing “media war” ’. Although the MDF tried to make its perfor-
mance a campaign theme, this ‘may have been unwise given the rather 
bleak popular assessment of the government’s record and the opposition 
parties’ enthusiasm to discuss governmental incompetence’ (Popescu and 
Tóka, 2000: 5). Thus, any attempts by the incumbent parties to mention 
modest economic gains (e.g. regarding inflation and wages) were met by 
the opposition with popular charges of incompetence.
This decline in economic rationales appears to have begun much ear-
lier, given their monotonic decline from 1990 to 1997 and a corresponding 
increase in cultural rationales given for Hungarians in Népszabadság’s 
editorials (as evidenced in the rationale with linear time column). 
Economic issues seem not to have had the justificatory purchase that they 
had after the country’s post-1990 rush into free-market reforms. Appeals 
to ‘things Hungarian’ seem to have replaced ones to bourgeois prosperity 
as rationales for the possible, impossible, inevitable and contingent in 
Hungarian life.1 7
Yet it is from Table 2’s significant three-way interactions that general-
izations can be inferred regarding the social domains within which 
modalities of achievement vs necessity were developing. As illustrated 
in Figure 1, post-1989 public discourse within Népszabadság is character-
ized by a linear decrease in the odds that editorialists gave political 
reasons for ‘that which is possible’ for Hungarians. This decline is 
superseded by an increase in the odds that they gave political reasons 
for things that are inevitable for Hungarians. Thus in accordance with 
our first hypothesis, H1, the evidence here is for a shift away from a 
modality of achievement (according to which political circumstances 
yield opportunities, or possibilities, for goal-attainment), toward a 
modality of necessity (according to which political circumstances pro-
vide reasons why one must do things).
Despite the overall decline in appeals to economic rationales, there has 
been a steady increase in the odds that editorialists provide economic 
reasons for ‘the possible’. That is, consistent with our second hypothesis 
(H2), there is evidence of an increasing tendency for editorialists to depict 
opportunities stemming from Hungary’s emerging market economy. In 
contrast, references to ‘economic reasons for the inevitable’ declined 
sharply after starting from a peak in 1990, but then showed a modest 
rebound shortly after the 1994 election. Here one finds evidence of what 
one might call IMF (International Monetary Fund) rhetoric, according to 
which Hungary’s dire economic situation is the reason why one must (i.e. 
inevitably) implement austere economic policies.
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Conclusion
To the pedestrian observer, Hungarians seem to be a fickle bunch. With 
each election they have turned the incumbent party out of office, replacing 
the rightist MDF with the leftist MSZP in 1994, then putting in power the 
rightist FIDESZ plus minority MDF in 1998, then returning the MSZP to 
power with a leftist minority SZDSZ in 2002. Yet if one follows the polls and 
the campaigns closely, it is clear that the message from the Hungarian pub-
lic has been quite consistent. Despite large shifts in party support, the elec-
torate has consistently voted for social justice and against potentially 
draconian free-market reforms. For instance, during the campaign leading 
up to the 1998 election, the incumbent MSZP promoted not-so-social- 
justice-like policies of continued economic austerity and integration with 
the West – a position evident in Figure 1 with the rise from 1995 to 1997 in 
economic rationales for inevitability (i.e. for dutiful implementation of aus-














Economic Rationales for Inevitability
Ecomomic Rationales for Possibility
Political Rationales for Inevitability
Political Rationales for Possibility
Figure 1   Trends in Log Odds that Economic or Political Rationales Were Given for 
Subjects’ Inevitabilities or Possibilities
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focused on attacking ‘regional disparities, growing income inequalities, 
better chances for big multinational companies than small and medium 
Hungarian businesses, population decline, cutback in education, health-
care, and family welfare’ (Popescu and Tóka, 2000: 6).18
Yet our Hungarian data illustrate the more general observation that as 
an alternative to authoritarianism, democracy does not comprise a spe-
cific social form. In accordance with Simmel, our argument has been that 
social systems are maintained by self-sustaining patterns of social interac-
tion and discourse. Whereas authoritarian societies are likely to be orga-
nized around loyalty networks and a modality of permission, democracies 
can be sustained via political modalities of achievement (as in the US) or 
necessity (as in the welfare states of Western Europe). Upon departing 
from a modality of permission, citizens of democratizing societies find 
their political discourse migrating primarily between two modalities with 
which to rationalize the activities its members believe to be possible, 
impossible, inevitable and contingent for each other. As for the segment 
of Hungarian public discourse investigated here, our data suggest that 
this migration has been toward a modality of necessity.
Notes
This research was sponsored in part by seed money from the Statistics Department 
at Iowa State University and from the Department of Sociology at the University 
of Groningen. Special thanks to Zoltán Daroczi for his substantive suggestions, 
plus his conscientious work in sampling and translation. Thanks too for thought-
ful comments from Kate Judge, Péter Róbert, András Vargha and Lilla Vicsek.
 1. Although our position in this article is that ‘social justice’ and ‘free market’ cor-
respond to discrete types of political discourse, political discourse is commonly 
operationalized along a social justice (left) vs free market (right) continuum 
(Budge et al., 2001; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Klingemann et al., 2006). Within 
the 1999 World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org/), representative 
samples of both US citizens and citizens from 10 Western European and 
Scandinavian countries ranked their political views along a 10-point scale (1 = 
left, 10 = right). The following mean scores on this scale accord with our depic-
tions of greater free-market political discourse in the US vs more social-justice 
political justice in these other countries: US (5.80), Denmark (5.51), Austria 
(5.42), Luxembourg (5.37), Sweden (5.34), Belgium (5.25), Germany (5.21), 
Netherlands (5.09), Great Britain (5.08), France (4.86) and Spain (4.79). (p < .001 
in t-tests between the US mean and means for each of the other countries.)
 2. Of course, transformations to democracy are doubtlessly facilitated or 
impeded by numerous other factors such as industrialization itself and the 
associated development of both an educated middle class (Huntington, 1991; 
Lipset, 1960) and a working class of rural-to-urban migrants (Maravall and 
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Santamaria, 1986), the diffusion of democracy among countries and access to 
diffusion-enabling communication technologies (Huntington, 1991; Markoff, 
1996; Verdery, 1993; Wejnert, 2005), plus the consolidation of state power and 
the relative influence of foreign powers (Bollen and Jackman, 1989; Crenshaw, 
1995; Rouquié, 1986; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Wallerstein, 1991) and the 
world economy (Castells and Laserna, 1994; Frieden, 1991; Martins, 1986). See 
Schwartzman (1998) for an excellent review of much of this literature.
 3. Beyond its fundamentally pro-market message, the circle’s call also appealed 
to social justice (i.e. to ‘Political and ideological reform which will rediscover 
and support every legitimate value of the socialist movement’ [O’Neil, 1996: 
292]) and to democracy as an end in itself.
 4. The following party abbreviations are used throughout this article: MSZP 
(Magyar Szocialista Párt) for the Hungarian Socialist Party; SZDSZ (Szabad 
Demokraták Szövetsége) for the Alliance of Free Democrats; MDF (Magyar 
Demokrata Fórum) for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and FIDESZ 
(Fidesz–Magyar Polgári Párt) for the League of Young Democrats–Hungarian 
Civic Party. After the 2002 elections, there were no parliamentary representa-
tives remaining from any other (religious, agrarian or nationalist) party that 
had previously participated in the Hungarian parliament.
 5. The degree of this conflict will vary greatly from one democracy to another. 
For example, Poland’s parliamentary confrontations are legendary, whereas 
those in Hungary have been the most civil among all recent East European 
democratizations. Seleny (1999: 503) has argued that this Hungarian ten-
dency for compromise stemmed in part from the MSZP’s eagerness to dis-
tance itself from its autocratic (i.e. uncompromising) Communist roots – a 
tendency to which we return when discussing our results.
 6. Both Ost (1993) and Comisso (1997) point to rationales given for preserving 
(linguistic, religious, etc.) traditions as a third internal justification given for 
political policies within democratizing East European countries. These cul-
ture- and security-related rationales (usually expressing desires that dispa-
rate Communist-era repressions not recur) are later shown in our findings to 
have no significant links to the discursive modalities of interest here.
 7. Modal logicians often conceptualize this fourfold character of modal expres-
sions (i.e. no negation, negated modal, negated infinitive and double nega-
tion) as the ‘Square of Oppositions’ (Horn, 1989; van der Auwera. 1996).
 8. To remain consistent with Simmel’s use of the term ‘form’, we refer in this 
article to permission (or flirtation), ability (or achievement) and necessity not 
only as distinct modalities, but also as social forms. However, this usage is 
likely to become confusing as each of these modalities is itself referred to as 
being expressed in four modal forms (i.e. contingency, possibility, impossibil-
ity and inevitability). Hopefully, these two uses of the word ‘form’ (i.e. modal-
ity as a social form vs a modality’s modal form), will not lead to confusion.
 9. Simmel referred to these first three modal forms as the ‘polar coordinates of 
flirtation’, which he respectively labeled flattery, provocation and contempt 
(Simmel, [1909] 1984: 135).
10. See a parallel discussion by Coleman (1990: 277ff.) on encouragement and 
reward-amplification within the context of rational choice theory.
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11. Modal logicians (e.g. Chellas, 1980: 7) argue that necessity (must) and ability 
(can) are redundant. For example, when one finds it necessary not to proceed, 
one is unable to proceed, and vice versa. The concept of modality being devel-
oped in this article differentiates ‘can’ and ‘must’ by situating each as the 
discursive mechanism driving a distinct social form.
12. Although necessity may seem a peculiar modality to most natives of the US, it 
has a long intellectual history in, for example, Rousseau’s ([1762] 1997) ‘social 
contract’ and Foucault’s (2000: 73ff.) panoptical modernity. Moreover, it is a 
modality familiar to the vast majority of citizens in the welfare states of Western 
Europe.
13. We had considered sampling pre-1989 issues of the newspaper. However, we 
found nearly all news coverage there to be descriptive, leaving us unable to 
identify any modal statements among these issues. Consistent with our ear-
lier discussion of the modality of permission within authoritarian states, this 
Communist-era evidence of journalists’ hesitance to reveal their opinions was 
most likely due to their having followed a strategy for prolonging the tension 
between the hoped for possibility and the feared impossibility of continuing 
in their livelihoods (see Gálik, 2004).
14. The equivalences in this paragraph follow standard rules of modal logic. For 
example, let ‘p’ be any proposition. ‘ p’ means ‘p must be true’ and ‘ p’ 
means ‘p can be true’. The first of these two logical expressions is true 
if and only if (↔) it is not (⌐) able to be true that p is false (or, in symbolic 
form: p ↔ ⌐ ⌐p). See Chellas (1980) or Mints (1992) for relatively acces-
sible introductory texts.
15. This study’s template, or semantic grammar (Roberts, 1997), has at least two 
advantages over co-occurrence approaches to the analysis of relations among 
themes in texts. First, by encoding these relations directly, it avoids the ecologi-
cal fallacy of inferring words’ interrelations based on their mere co-occurrence 
‘somewhere’ within the same text-window. Second, by not encoding relations 
directly, co-occurrence analyses introduce measurement error (i.e. false posi-
tives), thereby necessitating vast samples of text. Our approach affords as much 
power with much smaller samples, since it combines representative sampling 
with less error-prone encoding at the level of theme-relations (see Roberts et al., 
2008).
16. Texts from sampled editorials were encoded using Textual Content Analysis 
(Metatext, Inc.), or TCA – a general purpose interactive coding aid, writ-
ten in Visual C++® for Windows XP®. (Beta versions of TCA are available 
from the first author on request.) In independent encodings of a subsample 
of 68 modal–statement/rationale pairs, two trained coders’ interrater agree-
ment scores were k = .79 (t = 56.61) among modal forms and k = .89 (t = 63.09) 
among rationales (Popping, 1984; Scott, 1955).
17. Both of these linear trends in rationale usage are replicated in at least half of 
the four models in which that type of rational was estimated. In contrast, note 
that only a single marginally significant linear change in modal form was 
found (namely, ‘impossible with linear time’ when security is the model’s 
rationale type) but was replicated nowhere else. Wishing to avoid reporting 
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findings due to sampling error, we only discuss two-way interactions that are 
replicated in more than one of the models listed in Table 2.
18. Of course, more factors than social vs market justice have been involved in 
deciding the outcomes of these elections. The MSZP/SZDSZ coalition was 
hurt in 1998 by charges of corruption within the government’s privatization 
board (Szilagyi, 1996) and by an outbreak of shootings and bomb explosions 
in Budapest during the spring of the election (Popescu and Tóka, 2000: 6). The 
narrow MSZP/SZDSZ victory in 2002 may have turned on such non-issue 
criteria as youth mobilized by parents and cell phone technology (Sükösd 
and Dányi, 2003) and the MSZP’s and SZDSZ’s use of joint candidate lists 
during the runoff election (Nikolenyi, 2004).
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